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Over the last several decades, epidemiological studies have been enormously 
successful in identifying risk factors for major diseases. However, most of this 
research has focused attention on risk factors that are relatively proximal causes of 
disease such as diet, cholesterol level, exercise and the like. We question the 
emphasis on such individually-based risk factors and argue that greater attention 
must be paid to basic social conditions if health reform is to have its maximum 
effect in the time ahead. There are two reasons for this claim. First we argue that 
individually-based risk factors must be contextualized, by examining what puts 
people at risk of risks, if we are to craft effective interventions and improve the 
nation's health. Second, we argue that social factors such as socioeconomic status 
and social support are likely 'fundamental causes" of disease that, because they 
embody access to important resources, affect multiple disease outcomes through 
multiple mechanisms, and consequently maintain an association with disease even 
when intervening mechanisms change. Without careful attention to these 
possibilities, we run the risk of imposing individually-based intervention strategies 
that are ineffective and of missing opportunities to adopt broad-based societal 
interventions that could produce substantial health benefits for our citizens. 
Epidemiology has been enormously successful in heightening public awareness of risk 
factors for disease. Research findings are frequently and prominently publicized in the mass 
media and in rapidly proliferating university-based health newsletters. Moreover, there is 
evidence that the message has been received and that many people have at least attempted to 
quit smoking, include more exercise in their daily routine, and implement a healthier diet. 
With few exceptions, however, the new findings generated within the field of epidemiology 
have focused on risk factors that are relatively proximate "causes" of disease, such as diet, 
cholesterol, hypertension, electromagnetic fields, lack of exercise, and so on. Social factors, 
which tend to be more distal causes of disease, have received far less attention. ' This focus on 
more proximate links in the causal chain may be viewed by many, not as a limitation or bias, 
but as the rightful progression of science from identifying correlations to understanding causal 
relationships (e.g., Potter 1992). In fact, some in the so-called "modem" school of 
epidemiology (e.g., Rothman 1986) have explicitly argued that social conditions such as 
socioeconomic status are mere proxies for true causes lying closer to disease in the causal 
chain. 
This focus on proximate risk factors, potentially controllable at the individual level, 
resonates with the value and belief systems of Western culture that emphasize both the ability 
of the individual to control his or her personal fate and the importance of doing so (Becker 
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1993). This affinity between cultural values and the focus of contemporary epidemiology 
undoubtedly contributes to the level of public interest in epidemiological findings, and 
probably influences funding priorities as well. Thus modem epidemiology and cultural values 
conspire to focus attention on proximate, individually-based risk factors and away from social 
conditions as causes of disease. 
This is not to say that the role of social factors in disease causation has been neglected in all 
quarters. Medical sociologists and social epidemiologists have kept alive classical 
epidemiology's (e.g., Susser, Watson, and Hopper 1985) concern with social conditions and 
have made major strides toward documenting and understanding the connections between 
social factors and disease. However, we believe there are conceptual pitfalls that sometimes 
lead medical sociologists and social epidemiologists themselves to unwittingly reinforce the 
emphasis on proximate, individual-level risk factors. One of these pitfalls is that, in the process 
of elucidating the mechanisms connecting social conditions to health and illness-an important 
and desirable activity-we may, over time, lose interest in and come to neglect the importance 
of the social condition whose effect on health we originally sought to explain. Also, our 
tendency to focus on the connection of social conditions to single diseases via single 
mechanisms at single points in time neglects the multifaceted and dynamic processes through 
which social factors may affect health and, consequently, may result in an incomplete 
understanding and an underestimation ofthe influence of social factors on health. 
Our purposes here are to highlight he accomplishments of medical sociologists and social 
epidemiologists in advancing our understanding of social conditions as causes of disease, to 
underscore the critical importance of continued work in this direction, and to offer two 
conceptual frameworks that we hope will facilitate and enhance this research. First, we discuss 
the importance of "contextualizing" risk factors--that is, attempting to understand how people 
come to be exposed to individually-based risk factors such as poor diet, cholesterol, lack of 
exercise, or high blood pressure-so that we can design more effective interventions. Second, 
we introduce the notion that some social conditions may be "fundamental causes" of disease. 
A fundamental cause involves access to resources, resources that help individuals avoid 
diseases and their negative consequences through a variety of mechanisms. Thus, even if one 
effectively modifies intervening mechanisms or eradicates some diseases, an association 
between a fundamental cause and disease will reemerge. As such, fundamental causes can defy 
efforts to eliminate their effects when attempts to do so focus solely on the mechanisms that 
happen to link them to disease in a particular situation. We conclude by discussing the 
implications of these ideas for research and social policy. 
EVIDENCE LINKING SOCIAL CONDITIONS TO DISEASE 
We begin with a brief review of the evidence concerning the connection between social 
conditions and illness. For the purposes of this paper, we define social conditions as factors 
that involve a person's relationships to other people. These include everything from 
relationships with intimates to positions occupied within the social and economic structures of 
society. Thus, in addition to factors like race, socioeconomic status, and gender, we include 
stressful life events of a social nature (e.g., the death of a loved one, loss of a job, or crime 
victimization), as well as stress-process variables such as social support. 
Forty years of medical sociology have uncovered numerous examples of the social patterning 
of disease. Most obvious is the ubiquitous and often strong association between health and 
socioeconomic status. Lower SES is associated with lower life expectancy, higher overall 
mortality rates and higher rates of infant and perinatal mortality (Buck 1981; Dutton 1986; 
Illsley and Mullen 1985; Adler et al. 1994; Pappas et al. 1993). Moreover, low SES is 
associated with each of the 14 major cause-of-death categories in the International 
Classification of Diseases (Illsley and Mullen 1985), as well as many other health outcomes, 
including major mental disorders (Dohrenwend et al. 1980; Kessler et al. 1994). Other 
examples of the social patterning of disease are plentiful. Males have higher mortality rates at 
all ages (Walsh and Feldman 1981), as well as higher rates of coronary heart disease (Syme 
and Guralnik 1987), chronic respiratory diseases (Colley 1985) and ulcers (Gazzard and Lance 
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1982). There are pronounced gender differences in rates of various forms of cancer (Prout, 
Colton, and Smith 1987) and mental disorder (Dohrenwend et al. 1980; Kessler et al. 1994). 
African Americans have higher rates of overall mortality and infant mortality (Dutton 1986; 
Miller 1987), renal failure (Challah and Wing 1985), and stroke (Pedoe 1982a) than do Whites, 
but lower rates of coronary heart disease (Pedoe 1982b); cancer rates also differ by race and 
ethnicity (Prout et al. 1987). Both physical and mental disorders vary with marital status and 
population density (Kelsey 1993; Benenson 1987; Robins et al. 1984), and certain religious 
groups such as Mormons and Seventh Day Adventists have lower risks of some types of cancer 
(Saracci 1985). 
In addition, the tremendous growth and success of the stress paradigm have added 
considerably to the evidence for an association between social conditions and disease 
(Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1981; Pearlin et al. 1981; Turner and Marino 1994; Turner, 
Wheaton, and Lloyd 1995). Stressful ife events have been linked to heart disease, diabetes, 
cancers, stroke, fetal death, major depression, and low birth weight in offspring (Miller 1987; 
Brown and Harris 1989; Shrout et al. 1989). Research has also extended to the domains of 
social support (Berkman and Syme 1979; House, Landis, and Umberson 1988; Thoits 1982; 
Turner 1981; Turner, Grindstaff, and Phillips 1990; Turner and Marino 1994) and coping 
(Pearlin and Schooler 1978), which have been shown to be associated with health and 
well-being in their own right. 
The evidence reviewed to this point clearly establishes a strong and pervasive association 
between social conditions and disease. But medical sociologists and social epidemiologists 
have taken the field considerably beyond a description of the social patterning of disease. 
Important advances in establishing a causal role for social factors have focused on two major 
issues-the direction of causation between social conditions and health and the mechanisms 
that explain observed associations. In what follows we present prominent examples of work on 
these two issues. 
Concerning the issue of causal direction, important controversies urround some of the 
relationships between social conditions and health. For example, does low SES cause poor 
health, or does poor health cause downward mobility? Does social support reduce morbidity 
and mortality, or does illness restrict social interaction and thereby lead to social-support 
deficits? Social epidemiologists have used three general strategies to address these questions. 
One approach uses quasi-experimental strategies which involve locating conditions under 
which alternative explanations make different predictions about observable facts. This 
approach is exemplified by Dohrenwend's (1966) quasi-experiment designed to test social 
selection and social causation explanations for the association between SES and specific mental 
disorders. The two explanations make different predictions about rates of disorder in 
advantaged and disadvantaged ethnic groups, when socioeconomic status is held constant. The 
recent culmination of Dohrenwend's work on this problem, based on a large-scale 
epidemiological study in Israel (Dohrenwend et al. 1992), concluded that social causation was 
stronger than social selection in producing the inverse association of SES to major depression 
in women, and substance abuse and antisocial personality in men. For schizophrenia, however, 
the evidence was more supportive of the social-selection explanation. 
In the second strategy, medical sociologists and social epidemiologists identify social risk 
factors that cannot reasonably be conceived as having been caused by an individual's illness 
condition. Exemplifying this strategy is a study by Hamilton and colleagues (1990) concerning 
the effects of plant closings on auto-workers' mental health. The investigators compared 
workers who were laid off because of a plant closing, workers who anticipated being laid off, 
and workers whose plant was not closing, and found that those laid off were more likely to 
experience negative mental-health consequences-particularly if they were minorities and of 
low SES. Since the illness condition of the workers cannot be thought of as having caused the 
plant closing, the differences between the groups studied are more clearly interpretable as the 
effects of social conditions on health. This strategy was also employed by Fenwick and Tausig 
(1994) in a study that used the Census-based unemployment rate for an individual's occupation 
in a longitudinal design to show that when unemployment is higher, workers' job satisfaction, 
decision-making latitude, and well-being are lower. Again, since workers' health cannot cause 
the aggregate unemployment rate, the results are more readily interpretable as demonstrating 
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the influence of social conditions on health-related outcomes. Finally, studies of stressful 
circumstance have used this strategy by identifying "fateful" life events that are unlikely to 
have been caused by an individual's behavior (e.g., death of spouse, plant closing). Thus when 
Shrout et al. (1989) found the odds of developing major depression to be more than three times 
as high among people experiencing a recent fateful life event, the association was more clearly 
interpretable as an effect of social conditions. 
The third strategy adopted by social epidemiologists to clarify causal direction involves the 
use of longitudinal designs. When such designs can clearly place the emergence of an illness or 
an illness exacerbation before or after the social condition under study, a great deal can be 
learned about the direction of cause between the two. Unfortunately, some longitudinal studies 
do not allow clear inferences about time order and therefore do not provide the definitive 
evidence about causality that is sometimes attributed to them (see Link and Shrout 1992). Still, 
some notable studies have identified social conditions that clearly predate health outcomes and 
show that the social conditions predict morbidity and mortality even when competing risk 
factors are held constant. For example, Berkman and Syme (1979) used baseline data on social 
networks, collected in 1965, to predict mortality during the subsequent nine years. They found 
a near doubling of risk for mortality among those low on a social-network index as compared 
to those high on the index. Although this study controlled for many competing risks (smoking, 
obesity, physical activity, etc.), it did not include measures derived from a physical exam. A 
subsequent study by House, Landis, and Umberson (1988) did include a baseline physical 
exam and controlled for blood pressure, cholesterol evels, and other biomedical variables. 
These investigators found associations between social relationships and mortality that were 
similar to those reported by Berkman and Syme. This line of work has continued to become 
more and more refined. For example, in a recent longitudinal study, Berkman and colleagues 
(1992) have shown that a measure of perceived support collected before the occurrence of a 
heart attack predicts survival following the heart attack net of an impressive array of 
biomedical and psychosocial control variables. Other social variables have also been 
effectively studied with longitudinal designs. For example, Catalano and colleagues (1993) 
related job layoffs to the emergence or reemergence of alcohol abuse, and Lin and Ensel (1989) 
and Ensel and Lin (1991) showed that stressful circumstances predicted subsequent health and 
mental-health outcomes. 
Thus, while medical sociologists and social epidemiologists have not denied the possibility 
that illness affects ocial conditions (Johnson 1991), they have, at the same time, demonstrated 
a substantial causal role for social conditions as causes of illness. 
Research identifying the mechanisms linking social conditions to disease has also done much 
to move social epidemiology beyond the description of social patterns of disease. Consider, for 
example, the job-stress model of Karasek and colleagues that provides evidence for one 
mechanism linking SES to coronary heart disease among men. These investigators have shown 
that "job strain," characterized by a combination of high job demands and low decision 
latitude, is more common in lower status jobs and is associated with coronary heart disease 
(Karasek et al. 1988; Schnall et al. 1990) and elevated levels of ambulatory blood pressure 
both on and off the job (Schnall et al. 1992). Another example is the work of Mirowsky and 
Ross (1989), who elucidate the mechanisms that might account for social patterns of distress. 
They present evidence showing that alienation and perceived control over life circumstances 
underlie many social conditions that put people at risk for elevated levels of psychological 
distress. Consider as a final example a study by Rosenfield (1989) that sought to understand 
mechanisms producing gender differences in symptoms of depression and anxiety. Rosenfield 
shows that women have higher symptoms of depression and anxiety. This work shows that 
women have higher symptom levels than men when they are overloaded by work and family 
demands or when they experience low power as a consequence of being out of the labor 
market. Moreover, the common mechanism underlying low power and role overload is a 
decreased sense of personal control, which is in turn related to symptoms of anxiety and 
depression. 
Link and Dohrenwend (1989) explicitly advocate the approach of elucidating mechanisms 
because of its value in clarifying the relative merit of competing explanations for social patterns 
of disease. The rationale is that alternative xplanations for these patterns, such as social 
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causation and social selection, frequently imply different intervening mechanisms. Thus, 
evidence about which intervening mechanisms account for the association can help answer 
questions concerning causal direction and other competing explanations. Moreover, if causal 
links between distal factors (e.g., SES) and more proximal factors (e.g., occupational stress, 
diet) can be drawn, as Karasek et al. (1988), Mirowsky and Ross (1989), Rosenfield (1989), 
and others (Lennon 1987; Pearlin et al. 1981; Link, Lennon, and Dohrenwend 1993; 
Umberson, Wortman, and Kessler 1992) have done, it becomes increasingly clear that social 
conditions are causes exerting indirect effects on disease outcomes, rather than mere proxies as 
Rothman (1986) and others might claim. 
But are there unintended and undesirable consequences of an approach that focuses on inter- 
vening mechanisms? We believe there are. Despite the obvious benefits of such an approach, it 
is possible that in its enactment, one may inadvertently contribute o the focus on factors that are 
closer to disease in the causal chain. The intervening mechanism becomes the new and exciting 
"next step," while the social conditions become the old, passe "starting point." 
The evolution of the stress paradigm is a good example of such an inadvertent downgrading of 
the issue which provided the initial impetus for research. The social causation/social selection 
controversy concerning the association between socioeconomic status and mental disorder spawned 
an interest in stressful life events as a direct operationalization of the adversity that might be 
experienced in lower SES contexts (Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1969, 1981). When a con- 
sistent but modest association between stressful events and illness was identified (see Rabkin and 
Struening 1976), investigators elaborated the model to consider social support and coping as 
potential modifiers. Now researchers are invested in understanding the mechanisms linking these 
factors with disease. Also, research on the biological consequences of stress (e.g., immune status 
and elevated catecholamines) is seen as an exciting new development (e.g., Cohen, Tyrrell, and 
Smith 1991). In general, interest has followed the most recent step in the progression toward 
disease outcomes, while concern with the earlier foci has dissipated to a point where some express 
disinterest in factors uch as the causation/selection issue and the role of stressful life events in 
causing illness (but see Pearlin 1989; Dohrenwend 1990; Angermeyer and Klusman [1987] for 
dissenting views). Indeed Angermeyer and Klusman (1987) documented a sharp decline in the 
number of publications focused on social class and mental disorder in the period from 1966 to 
1985, while the number of articles on stress and psychiatric disorders increased rapidly during the 
same period. To the extent hat interest in mechanisms increases at the expense of more funda- 
mental social conditions, medical sociologists may unwittingly contribute to the emphasis on 
individual factors and play into the hands of those who argue that social factors have only a modest 
role in disease causation. 
To this point, we have described two characterizations ofsocial conditions as causes of disease 
that either advertently or inadvertently downplay their importance. One of these is the outright 
declaration that social factors are only proxies for true causes. This position is demonstrably 
unwarranted given the achievements of medical sociology and social epidemiology over the past 
few decades. The other characterization, which may be partially constructed by medical sociol- 
ogists and social epidemiologists hemselves, isthe view that social factors erve as starting points 
whose main function is to point the direction to more proximal risk factors. We take sharp issue 
with both of these characterizations. In the next two sections, we develop two concepts that 
illustrate the critical importance of social factors in disease causation, provide conceptual frame- 
works for future research in this area, and point to the problems that may ensue if the role of social 
conditions is neglected by researchers and policymakers. These are the ideas of "contextualizing 
risk factors" and "fundamental causes." 
CONTEXTUALIZING RISK FACTORS 
We suggest that medical sociologists and social epidemiologists need to counter the 
trajectory of modem epidemiology toward identifying risk factors that are increasingly 
proximate to disease-ones for which "biological plausibility" can be argued. One way they 
can do this is by "contextualizing" individually-based risk factors. By this we mean that 
investigators must (1) use an interpretive framework to understand why people come to be 
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exposed to risk or protective factors and (2) determine the social conditions under which 
individual risk factors are related to disease. We present examples that illustrate both these 
principles. 
First, an important strategy for reducing the threat of AIDS is to educate the public 
concerning the steps they must take as individuals to reduce their risk of contracting or 
infecting others with the HIV virus. Clearly, however, some people are better able to take 
advantage of this information than others. By contextualizing risk factors for AIDS, we may be 
able to understand why some people cannot avoid the risk. For example, homeless or other 
extremely poor women who turn to prostitution as a survival strategy may not have the options 
or resources that would enable them to refuse to engage in risky sexual behaviors, no matter 
how well informed they may be about the risks they face. This example suggests that medical 
sociologists and social epidemiologists need to contextualize risk factors by asking what it is 
about people's life circumstances that shapes their exposure to such risk factors as unprotected 
sexual intercourse, poor diet, a sedentary lifestyle, or a stressful home life. 
Our second example concerns the increasing attention being paid to the public health 
problem posed by contamination of meat, poultry, and eggs with E. coli and salmonella 
bacteria. The public has been warned to rinse and cook meat and poultry thoroughly and to 
carefully wash hands, knives, cutting boards, and so on. Because some follow these safety 
guidelines more assiduously than others, one can imagine a risk profile of individual behaviors 
that might predict bacterial infection. These precautions are only necessary, however, when the 
food that reaches the marketplace is contaminated. Government actions in the 1980s that 
reduced the number of government inspectors and deregulated the meat-processing industry 
have created the need for vigilance on the part of individuals. While the current approach to the 
problem focuses on the individual, it can readily be seen that economic and political forces 
shape individuals' exposure to this risk. This example suggests that medical sociologists and 
social epidemiologists need to contextualize by asking under what social conditions individual 
risk factors lead to disease and whether there are any social conditions under which the 
individual-level risk factors would have no effect at all on disease outcome. 
While the importance of contextualizing risk factors may seem obvious, if we take a hard 
look at even some of the most influential reas of research in medical sociology, we will find 
that much more of this kind of contextualizing is needed. Consider again the stress paradigm. 
While there are hundreds if not thousands of studies relating stressful circumstances to health 
outcomes, until the recent efforts of Turner and colleagues (Turner and Marino 1994; Turner, 
Wheaton, and Lloyd 1995), there was very little even descriptive data about the social origins 
of stressful circumstances (but see Smith 1992; Goldberg and Comstock 1980). 
Why is it so important that we strive to contextualize risk factors? One reason is that efforts 
to reduce risk by changing behavior may be hopelessly ineffective if there is no clear 
understanding of the process that leads to exposure. For example, there are powerful social, 
cultural, and economic factors shaping the diet of poor people in the United States. 
Consequently, providing information about healthy diet to poor people and exhorting them to 
follow nutritional guidelines is unlikely to have much impact. Without an understanding ofthe 
context hat leads to risk, the responsibility for reducing the risk is left with the individual, and 
nothing is done to alter the more fundamental factors that put people at risk of risks. 
This line of thinking suggests that medical sociologists and social epidemiologists should turn 
on its head the now-popular tendency to examine risk factors that are ever closer to disease in a 
causal chain. Rather, it suggests that it is just as important to face the other direction and search 
for the factors that put people at risk of risks. It exhorts researchers both to explore the social 
origins of risks and to ask whether individually-based risk factors are context-dependent i  the 
sense of influencing health outcomes only within the context of a specific set of social conditions. 
FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES 
In addition to the obvious need to contextualize risk factors, medical sociologists and social 
epidemiologists need to take as their task the identification a d thorough consideration of social 
conditions that are what we term "fundamental causes" of disease. We call them 
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"fundamental" causes because, as we shall see, the health effects of causes of this sort cannot 
be eliminated by addressing the mechanisms that appear to link them to disease. The possibility 
that some social conditions have this fundamental quality with regard to health was first 
presented by House and colleagues in a discussion of potential reasons for the persistent 
association between SES and disease (House et al. 1990, 1994). We elaborate upon these ideas 
to build our concept of fundamental social causes of disease. 
The Case of SES and Disease. The idea that social conditions might influence health was 
forcefully asserted by nineteenth-century ph sicians who founded the field of social medicine. 
Virchow (1848), for example, declared that "medicine is a social science." And, of course, it 
was in part the strong association between indicators of poverty and health that supported this 
claim. The reasons for the powerful association were also thought o be apparent, residing in 
the dire housing, sanitation, and work conditions of poor people at the time (Rosen 1979). 
With tremendous medical advances and extensive public health initiatives, the incidence of 
such diseases as diphtheria, measles, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, and syphilis declined 
dramatically. In addition, in modern welfare states, poor people's access to care increased 
substantially. By the 1960s, many of the factors that had been identified as linking SES to 
disease had been addressed, and one might have expected the association to wane and perhaps 
disappear altogether. Indeed, this is exactly the conclusion that Charles Kadushin reached in a 
1964 article in Sociological Inquiry (Kadushin 1964). Startled that social scientists had not 
recognized the demise of the SES gradient in health, Kadushin reminded his readers that most 
of the mechanisms thought o produce SES differences in health in the United States had been 
addressed and that "as countries advance in their standard of living, as public sanitation 
improves, as mass immunization proceeds, and as Dr. Spock becomes even more widely read, 
the gross factors which intervene between social class and exposure to disease will become 
more and more equal for all social classes" (1964:75). As a result, Kadushin declared, 
Americans from the lower classes are no more likely to develop disease than those from the 
middle or upper classes. 
Of course, Kadushin's prediction turned out to be dramatically incorrect as indicated by 
studies (cited above) documenting an enduring or even an increasing (Pappas et al. 1993) 
association between SES and many disease outcomes. But what was wrong with Kadushin's 
reasoning? Hadn't he engaged in logic that most of us not only accept but take for granted? 
Having implicitly drawn the path model with SES as the distal factor that is linked to disease 
by more proximal risk factors, and having observed that the proximal risk factors in the model 
had been largely eliminated as causal agents, he concluded that the SES-disease association 
should have disappeared. But it didn't. 
On the face of it, the reason Kadushin's 1964 prediction turned out to be wrong is readily 
apparent when one compares the intervening risk factors he considered to the intervening risk 
factors identified by Adler and colleagues in their 1994 review of socioeconomic status and 
health. The "gross" risk factors of sanitation and immunization that Kadushin mentioned are 
replaced in the Adler and colleagues' review by risk factors that include smoking, exercise, and 
diet, among others. Further, the evidence suggests that several of the risk factors mentioned by 
Adler and colleagues were not important intervening mechanisms when Kadushin wrote. 
Before the 1960s, for example, there was no evidence that rates of smoking were higher among 
lower SES individuals. Rather, the association emerged during the 1960s because people of 
higher socioeconomic status were likely to start smoking and more likely to quit if they had 
started (Ernster 1988; Novotny et al. 1988). Similar changes have occurred in other risk-related 
behaviors. For example, in considering the strong evidence that declines in coronary heart 
disease have been greatest among people of higher socioeconomic status, Beaglehole (1990) 
pointed to the fact that higher SES individuals have been better informed about and more able 
to implement changes in health behaviors like smoking, exercise, and diet. The result has been 
a widening of the gap in rates of heart disease between the rich and the poor (Beaglehole 
1990). Thus studies of the association between SES and disease over the past several decades 
reveal an important fact-the risk factors mediating the association have changed. As some 
risk factors were eradicated, others emerged or were newly discovered. As new risk factors 
became apparent, people of higher SES were more favorably situated to know about the risks 
and to have the resources that allowed them to engage in protective fforts to avoid them. 
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From one vantage point, this account of the association between SES and disease might be 
seen as a curious story in the history of social epidemiology-an instance in which unique 
historical events pulled the rug out from under an otherwise reasonable hypothesis put forward 
by Kadushin in 1964. Far more likely, however, is the possibility that the effect of SES on 
disease has endured-despite radical changes in intervening risk factors-because a deeper 
sociological process is at work. If so, what happened over the past several decades will 
continue to happen and if, at this particular point in time, we presume that an understanding of 
the SES-disease association lies in tracing the mechanisms that currently appear to link the two, 
time will prove to be as wrong as Kadushin was. This will occur, we argue, because SES is a 
fundamental cause of disease. 
Fundamental Social Causes of Disease. Our discussion of SES to this point has focused on 
its persistent association with disease despite changes in intervening mechanisms. However, 
we have not yet explicitly indicated why SES, or any fundamental cause, might maintain this 
kind of enduring relationship with disease. 
The reason for such persistent associations, and the essential feature of fundamental social 
causes, is that they involve access to resources that can be used to avoid risks or to minimize 
the consequences of disease once it occurs. We define resources broadly to include money, 
knowledge, power, prestige, and the kinds of interpersonal resources embodied in the concepts 
of social support and social network. Variables like SES, social networks, and stigmatization 
are used by medical sociologists and social epidemiologists to directly assess these resources2 
and are therefore especially obvious as potential fundamental causes. However, other variables 
examined by medical sociologists and social epidemiologists, such as race/ethnicity and 
gender, are so closely tied to resources like money, power, prestige, and/or social 
connectedness that they should be considered as potential fundamental causes of disease as 
well. 
An additional condition that must obtain for fundamental causes to emerge is change over 
time in the diseases afflicting humans, the risks for those diseases, knowledge about risks, or 
the effectiveness of treatments for diseases. If no new diseases emerged (such as AIDS), no 
new risks developed (such as pollutants), no new knowledge about risks emerged (as about 
cigarette smoking in the 1950s and 1960s), and no new treatments were developed (such as 
heart transplants), the concept of fundamental social causes would not apply. In such a static 
system, as risk factors known to intervene between a social cause and disease are blocked, the 
association between the social cause and disease would decline in lockstep. But, of course, this 
is nothing like the situation humans have ever confronted with regard to health. In the context 
of a dynamic system with changes in diseases, risks, knowledge of risks, and treatments, 
fundamental causes are likely to emerge. The reason is that resources like knowledge, money, 
power, prestige, and social connectedness are transportable from one situation to another, and 
as health-related situations change, those who command the most resources are best able to 
avoid risks, diseases, and the consequences of disease. Thus, no matter what the current profile 
of diseases and known risks happens to be, those who are best positioned with regard to 
important social and economic resources will be less afflicted by disease. 
The foregoing reasoning suggests two further attributes of fundamental causes. Because a 
fundamental cause involves access to broadly serviceable resources, it influences (1) multiple 
risk factors and (2) multiple disease outcomes. This is an important observation, because it 
alerts us to the possibility that the association between a fundamental cause and disease can be 
preserved through changes either in the mechanisms or in the outcomes. The idea that multiple 
mechanisms may contribute to a persistent association between a cause and an effect comes 
from sociologist Stanley Lieberson. Lieberson (1985) proposed that some causes, which he 
called "basic causes," have enduring effects on a dependent variable because, when the effect 
of one mechanism declines, the effect of another emerges or becomes more prominent. We 
have already described the example of the changing role of mechanisms like smoking, 
exercise, and diet in relation to the association between socioeconomic status and disease. 
While these variables were no doubt always linked to disease, their connection to 
socioeconomic status changed when knowledge about their importance in health became 
available. We take the idea that a cause can affect multiple health outcomes from social 
epidemiologist John Cassel. Cassel (1976) points out that some social factors make individuals 
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vulnerable, not to a specific disease, but to a wide array of diseases. As a result, investigations 
of the relationship of such social factors to specific manifestations of disease are of limited 
utility. Since only one manifestation of the social cause is measured in such studies, the full 
impact of the social cause goes unrecorded (also see Aneshensel 1992; Aneshensal, Rutter, and 
Lachenbruch 1991; Cullen 1984). However, in addition to underestimating the full impact of 
social causes at any given time, a narrow focus on one disease at a time misses the possibility 
that changes in particular disease outcomes can lead to enduring associations between 
fundamental causes and disease overall. When health surveillance or immunization systems fail 
and old diseases begin to reemerge (TB, measles) or when new diseases enter a population 
(AIDS), they do so in the context of existing social conditions that are ripe environments for 
producing mechanisms that link fundamental social causes to new or reemerging diseases. 
Thus, for example, before 1980, SES was linked to the intravenous use of drugs, which in turn 
had negative health consequences. But with the emergence of AIDS, this SES-linked risk 
factor came to have an even more potent effect on health. Indeed, AIDS will likely become a 
significant contributor to SES differentials in mortality in the time ahead due to the rapid 
spread of infection in low-income areas (Brunswick et al. 1993). Similarly, the reemergence of 
drug-resistant tuberculosis is striking poor inner-city populations to a far greater extent han it 
is higher-status suburban areas. 
In sum, a fundamental social cause of disease involves resources that determine the extent o 
which people are able to avoid risks for morbidity and mortality.3 Because resources are 
important determinants of risk factors, fundamental causes are linked to multiple disease 
outcomes through multiple risk-factor mechanisms. Moreover, because social and economic 
resources can be used in different ways in different situations, fundamental social causes have 
effects on disease even when the profile of risk factors changes radically. It follows that the 
effect of a fundamental cause cannot be explained by the risk factors that happen to link it to 
disease at any given time. 
Research Implications. All too frequently, even those of us who believe that social 
conditions are important for health are lulled into thinking that the best way to understand and 
ultimately address the effects of social conditions is to identify the intervening links. Indeed, it 
is precisely this reasoning that Adler and colleagues use to assert that psychologists have an 
important role to play in addressing the SES-disease association-the risk factors they 
identified were individually-based behaviors that psychologists are well-equipped to address. 
But the concept of a fundamental cause sensitizes us to the possibility that fundamental social 
causes cannot be fully understood by tracing the mechanisms that appear to link them to 
disease. To be sure, a focus on mechanisms can help identify variables more proximal to 
health, and if such risks are addressed, the health of the public can be improved. However, in 
the context of a dynamic system in which risk factors, knowledge of risk factors, treatments, 
and patterns of disease are changing, the association between a fundamental social cause and 
disease will endure because the resources it entails are transportable tonew situations. If one 
genuinely wants to alter the effects of a fundamental cause, one must address the fundamental 
cause itself. 
There are two implications of this reasoning. First, medical sociologists and social 
epidemiologists need to be careful in interpreting and communicating the meaning of research 
involving social factors, intervening mechanisms, and disease. Specifically, if the social factor 
is a fundamental cause, one cannot claim to have accounted for its effects by having 
"explained" its association with the inclusion of intervening variables in a path or regression 
model. Second, to understand associations between fundamental causes and disease, medical 
sociologists need to examine the broader determinants ofthe resources that fundamental causes 
entail. This distinctly sociological enterprise will link medical sociologists to the broader 
discipline in a productive way as we seek to understand how general resources like knowledge, 
money, power, prestige, and social connections are transformed into the health-related 
resources that generate patterns of morbidity and mortality. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Mechanic and Aiken (1986) argue that, rather than leading to specific policies, the main 
contribution of social science research to social change is through its influence on the way 
policymakers and the general public think about social and health problems. This paper aims to 
make such a contribution by drawing attention to the progress made by medical sociologists 
and social epidemiologists in recent years and by offering the concepts of "contextualizing risk 
factors" and "fundamental causes." 
On its own, the focus on individually-based risk factors that has dominated much 
population-based medical research in recent years is inadequate.4 To be sure, this focus is a 
compelling attention-getter, since the findings it generates are highly relevant to any given 
individual. They can lead to "personal policy" changes such as a reduction in fat intake, a little 
exercise, or an aspirin a day-actions that individual people can control personally. But those 
who craft policy for populations can be led astray if their purview is narrowly limited to a focus 
on individually-based risk factors. This paper reveals two reasons why this is so. First, without 
understanding the social conditions that expose people to individually-based risk factors, 
interventions will fail more often than they should. This will occur because interventions will 
be targeted to behaviors that are resistant o change for unrecognized reasons. The consequence 
will be that lives and money are wasted, and the American public will lose confidence in our 
ability to implement changes that really improve health. Second, some social conditions are 
fundamental causes of disease and as such cannot be effectively addressed by readjusting the 
individually-based mechanisms that appear to link them to disease in a given context. If we 
wish to alter the effects of these potent determinants of disease, we must do so by directly 
intervening in ways that change the social conditions themselves. 
The issues addressed in this paper suggest three general criteria that policymakers should use 
in evaluating whether to commit funds to a proposed health intervention: 
(1) Consistent with the idea of contextualizing risk factors, policymakers should require that 
all interventions seeking to change individual risk profiles contain an analysis of factors that 
put people at risk of risks. This will avoid the enactment of interventions aimed at changing 
behaviors that are powerfully influenced by factors left untouched by the intervention. Ifthe 
evidence is to come from studies that involve the experimental manipulation of a risk factor, 
policymakers should require confirmation that the intervention works outside of the 
experimental context. The reason for this is that, by experimentally manipulating the risk factor 
(e.g., diet or exercise), the researchers have removed from consideration the social factors that 
determine xposure to the risk factor in the natural environment. Outside the experimental 
context, the factors that put people at risk of risks may dominate, resulting in the intervention's 
ultimate failure. 
(2) Consistent with the concept of fundamental causes, health policymakers should consider 
whether a proposed intervention will have an impact on just one disease or whether, because of 
its influence on a fundamental cause, it will affect many diseases. An intervention that has 
even a modest impact on many diseases may be far more important han one that has a 
relatively strong impact on just one. 
(3) Health policymakers concerned with broad social conditions as causes of disease should 
regard with skepticism interventions that focus only on intervening variables but claim to 
address the broader social condition. Even an "effective" intervention that addresses the 
identified risk factor will, in the long run, fail to eliminate the effect of a fundamental social 
condition. In a changing state of affairs, the resources that accrue to the more advantaged allow 
them to regain the health advantage that may have been dented temporarily by the intervention. 
If one wishes to address fundamental social causes, the intervention must address inequality 
in the resources that fundamental causes entail. Many people and some medical sociologists 
believe that this is impractical-even to think about-because, for them, inequality is so firmly 
entrenched that nothing much can be done about it. Believing this, the only reasonable thing to 
do is to focus on more proximal individually-based risk factors, even if doing so has little 
long-run bearing on the association between fundamental social causes and disease. 
But this reasoning is shortsighted. There are many policies that have a direct bearing on the 
extent of inequality in our society and thus on the extent o which people from different social 
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circumstances have access to health-related resources. To be sure, these policies are rarely 
discussed with reference to their health implications. Still, policies relevant to fundamental 
causes of disease form a major part of the national agenda, whether this involves the minimum 
wage, housing for homeless people, capital-gains taxes, parenting leave, head-start programs, 
or other initiatives of this type. Such policy initiatives often lie outside the realm of influence 
and expertise of health policy experts. Yet if fundamental causes are potent determinants of 
disease, the potential health impact of these broad policies needs to be thoroughly 
understood-a task that medical sociologists and social epidemiologists should take up more 
thoroughly than they have. Ideally, a research-based "health impact statement" should 
accompany such plans, and health experts should be trained in the skills needed to produce 
such a statement. 
CONCLUSION 
The dominant focus in epidemiology and perhaps the American culture in general is on 
individually-based risk factors that lie relatively close to disease in a causal chain. But this 
focus overlooks important sociological processes and, as a result, could lead us to actions that 
limit our ability to improve the nation's health. We have focused on two concepts- 
contextualizing risk factors and fundamental causes-that direct our attention to precisely those 
factors that are left unexamined in the currently dominant orientation to research on risk factors 
for disease. If future research by medical sociologists and social epidemiologists increases our 
understanding of the processes implied by these concepts, we will be better positioned as a 
society to further improve the nation's health. 
NOTES 
1. Using the American Journal of Epidemiology as an indication of the current emphasis of 
epidemiological research, we. reviewed the 240 articles published between November of 1992 and 
1993. Excluding methodological reports (N=44) and studies focused exclusively on descriptive 
epidemiology (N = 15), we found that only 13.3 percent (24/181) of the articles focused on risk factors 
that could be construed as social in nature. Moreover, because many of these articles examined race, 
ethnicity or gender, without explicit reference to the social aspects of these characteristics, our figure 
of 13.3% should be considered an upper-bound estimate of the journal's focus on social factors. 
2. We include stigmatization because it is so closely tied to the prestige system (Goode 1978). Prestige, 
or the general standing that an individual holds in the eyes of others, is an important resource that is 
likely to have many implications for health-either indirectly through resources like money, power, or 
social connections, or more directly through what a person and/or those around him/her believe he/she 
deserves from the social environment. Stigmatization is important because it involves the denial of the 
benefits of prestige. 
3. We focus here on fundamental social causes of disease. It is possible to conceive of fundamental 
psychological or biological causes as well. For example, at the psychological level, one might 
consider a mastery orientation to be a resource that would be linked to many mechanisms and thus to 
many diseases. Similarly, at the biological level, the immune system might be conceptualized as a 
resource that would influence many specific mechanisms and thus many disease outcomes. In either of 
these cases, the association between the fundamental cause (mastery or immune system) and disease 
outcomes would likely endure even if the specific mechanisms were to change. Our main point 
regarding social factors as fundamental causes is not that fundamental causes should be taken seriously 
because they are often social, but rather that social conditions need to be taken seriously because they 
are often fundamental causes. 
4. In addition to the factors we consider here, it is important to recall that this individually-based risk 
factor approach can also have deleterious effects by shifting an excessive portion of the blame to the 
individual. When research focuses attention on individually-based causes of disease, the onus is often 
taken off broader-based conditions. Morbidity and mortality due to tobacco is attributed to an 
individually-based bad habit rather than to a heavily advertised, government-subsidized, highly 
profitable killer industry. 
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